



Department of Economics and Management

DEM Working Paper Series

**Monetary transmission models for bank
interest rates**

Laura Parisi
(Università di Pavia)

Igor Gianfrancesco
(Banco di Desio e della Brianza,)

Camillo Gilberto
(Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena)

Paolo Giudici
(Università di Pavia)

101 (05-15)

Via San Felice, 5
I-27100 Pavia
<http://epmq.unipv.eu/site/home.html>

May 2015

Monetary transmission models for bank interest rates

L. Parisi^{a,*}, I. Gianfrancesco^b, C. Giliberto^c, P. Giudici^a

^a*Department of Economics and Management, University of Pavia, Via S. Felice 5,
27100 Pavia (PV), Italy*

^b*Banco di Desio e della Brianza, Risk Management Division, Via E. Rovagnati 1,
20832 Desio (MB), Italy*

^c*Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena, Via Montanini 82, 53100 Siena (SI), Italy*

Abstract

Monetary policies, either actual or perceived, cause changes in monetary interest rates. These changes impact the economy through financial institutions, which react to changes in the monetary rates with changes in their administered rates, on both deposits and lendings.

The dynamics of administered bank interest rates in response to changes in money market rates is essential to examine the impact of monetary policies on the economy. Chong et al. (2006) proposed an error correction model to study such impact, using data previous to the recent financial crisis.

In this paper we examine the validity of the model in the recent time period, characterised by very low monetary rates. The current state of close-to-zero interest rates is of particular relevance, as it has never been studied before.

Our main contribution is a novel, more parsimonious, model and a predictive performance assessment methodology, which allows to compare it with the error correction model.

We also contribute to the literature on interest rate risk modelling propos-

ing a forward looking method to allocate on-demand deposits to non-zero time maturity bands, according to the predicted bank rates.

Keywords: Error Correction Model, Forecasting Bank Rates, Monte Carlo predictions, Interest Rate Risk models

JEL: C15, C20, E47, G32

1 Introduction

Monetary policies, such as variations in the official rate or liquidity injections, cause changes in monetary interest rates. These changes impact the economy mainly in an indirect way, through financial institutions, which react to changes in the monetary rates with changes in their administered rates, on both deposits and lendings.

The dynamics of administered bank interest rates in response to changes in money market rates is essential to examine the impact of monetary policies on the economy. This dynamics has been the subject of an extensive literature; the available studies differ, depending on the used models, the period under analysis and the geographical reference.

The relationship between market rates and administered rates is a complicated one and the evidence presented, thus far, is mixed and inconclusive. Hannan and Berger (1991), for example, examine the deposit rate setting behaviour of commercial banks in the United States and find that (a) banks in more concentrated markets exhibit greater rates rigidity; (b) larger banks

*Corresponding author, Tel. number +39 0382 986152, Fax number +39 0382 22486
Email addresses: laura.parisi01@universitadipavia.it (L. Parisi),
igianfrancesco@luiss.it (I. Gianfrancesco), camillogiliberto@gmail.com (C. Giliberto), paolo.giudici@unipv.it (P. Giudici)

17 exhibit less rates rigidity; and (c) deposit rates are more rigid upwards than
18 downwards. Scholnick (1996), similarly, finds that deposit rates are more
19 rigid when they are below their equilibrium level than when they are above;
20 his finding on lending rate adjustment, however, is mixed. Heffernan (1997)
21 examines how the lending and deposit rates of four banks and three building
22 societies respond to changes in the base rate set by the Bank of England
23 and finds that (a) there is very little evidence on the asymmetric nature
24 of adjustments in both the deposit and lending rates, (b) there is no sys-
25 tematic difference in the administered rate pricing dynamics of banks and
26 building societies, and (c) the adjustment speed for deposit rates is, on
27 average, roughly the same as that for loan rates.

28 More recent papers on the same issue include: Ballester et al. (2009),
29 Chong et al. (2006), Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999), Flannery et al.
30 (1984), Maudos et al. (2004), Maudos et al. (2009). Among them, Chong
31 et al. (2006), who applies and extends Engle and Granger (1987) error
32 correction model has become a reference paper, in both the academic and
33 the professional field.

34 The empirical evidence contained in all the previous papers can be sum-
35 marized in the following points: (a) bank rates react with a partial and
36 delayed change to changes in the monetary rates; (b) the speed and the
37 degree to which they follow these changes present substantial differences
38 between the various categories of banking products and between different
39 countries.

40 The previous conclusions have been obtained for a relatively stable time
41 period, previous to the emergence of the recent financial crisis.

42 After 2008, however, we have witnessed substantial changes. From a

43 macroeconomic viewpoint, monetary interest rates are now, in most devel-
44 oped economies, close to zero, or negative; from a microeconomic viewpoint,
45 bank management has changed substantially, for the compression of interest
46 margins and for the increase in regulatory capital requirements. The effects
47 of the previous changes on the transmission of monetary policies have not
48 been yet fully investigated. In particular, the current state of close-to-zero
49 interest rates is of particular relevance, as it has never been studied before.

50 When monetary rates are close to zero, the error correction model, albeit
51 formally elegant, does not well capture the dynamic of administered rates,
52 which appears strongly inertial.

53 The need of adapting the error correction model to the current situation
54 is very relevant, not only from a macroeconomic point of view, but also from
55 a microeconomic bank perspective and, in particular, in the measurement of
56 interest rate risk, and in the related asset and liability management policies.

57 The current regulatory framework requires that banks measure interest
58 rate risk, and disclose it, within the calculation of the internal economic
59 capital. This implies that the lending activity of a bank should be calibrated
60 also on the basis of the economic capital required to cover the additional
61 interest rate risk. Indeed, in a typical commercial bank, interest rate risk is
62 the second risk in size, after credit risk.

63 There is a limited scientific literature on interest rate risk modelling.
64 This type of risk has assumed some importance as a result of the crisis
65 of American Savings and Loans of the eighties. Immediately after such
66 breakdown, in fact, economists developed the Federal Reserve Economic
67 Value Model, based on the economic value perspective. Such a model is
68 described, for example, in Houpt and Embersit (1991), English (2002) and

69 English et al. (2012).

70 In 2004 the Basel Committee (BIS, 2004) published the final version
71 of the technical document entitled "Principles for the management of the
72 interest rate risk", which proposes a measurement methodology based on
73 the same logic underlying the model developed by the Federal Reserve. The
74 model proposed by the Basel Committee has been the subject of further
75 academic research, carried out, for example, by Fiori and Iannotti (2007),
76 and by Entrop, Wilkens, and Zeisler (2009). A key research issue that
77 has emerged is the treatment of on-demand positions, which are the ones
78 with the highest reactivity to monetary rate changes. Blochlinger (2015)
79 has shown that on-demand positions are very important risky options, and
80 have shown how to hedge their embedded risk.

81 On-demand positions are present in both the lending and in the deposit
82 side of the balance sheet. However, on-demand deposits are more relevant,
83 being exogenous to the bank, and with a "real" maturity that is much
84 longer than what implied by their on-demand contractual nature. Indeed,
85 regulatory authorities, such as the Basel Committee, suggest that, for the
86 calculation of interest rate risk, on-demand deposits (but not lendings) could
87 be allocated to different time maturity bands, from very short ones (up to
88 one month) to long ones (more than twenty years).

89 The first aim of this paper is to broaden the error correction model of
90 Chong et al. (2006), in a predictive performance comparison framework.
91 Our results show that the error correction model performs quite well in a
92 predictive sense. We also show that a more parsimonious model, described
93 by only one equations, rather than two, is not inferior in terms of predictive
94 performance, and, therefore, represents a valid alternative.

95 The second aim of the paper is to propose an allocation structure for
96 on-demand deposits based on the predicted term structure of bank interest
97 rates, based on a forward-looking perspective, rather than on a historical,
98 backward-looking one, as done in the current practice.

99 Our proposed methods are applied to data from the recent period (1999-
100 2014), of a southern European country, with a traditional banking sector:
101 Italy.

102 The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the proposed
103 models and, in particular: Section 2.1 describes the error correction model;
104 Section 2.2 motivates and introduces the new proposed model; Section 2.3
105 provides the predictive performance environment used to compare the two
106 models; Section 2.4 presents our proposal for the allocation of on demand
107 deposits. Section 3 shows the empirical evidence obtained from the appli-
108 cation of the models and, in particular: Section 3.1 describes the available
109 data; Section 3.2 presents the estimation results obtained when the models
110 are applied to such data; Section 3.3 compares the models in predictive per-
111 formance; Section 3.4 contains the application of the models to interest rate
112 risk measurement. Finally, Section 4 concludes with some final remarks.

113 **2. Methodology**

114 *2.1. The error correction model*

115 In line with the contribution of Chong et al. (2006), the relationship
116 between monetary rates and administered bank rates can be analyzed with
117 the use of the Error Correction Model (ECM), following the procedure pro-
118 posed by Engle and Granger (1987). The model is based on two equations.
119 A long-run relationship provides a measure of how a change in the monetary

120 rate is reflected in the bank rate. A short-run equation, which includes an
 121 error correction term, analyzes variations of the administered interest rates
 122 as a function of variations in the monetary rates.

123 Indeed, Chong et al. (2006) extended Engle and Granger by allowing
 124 the effect of the error correction term to depend on its sign. Their complete
 125 model can be formalized as follows:

$$\begin{cases} BR_t = k + \beta \cdot MR_t + \epsilon_t \\ \Delta BR_t = \alpha \cdot \Delta MR_t + \delta_1(BR_{t-1} - \beta \cdot MR_{t-1} - k) + \\ \quad + \delta_2(BR_{t-1} - \beta \cdot MR_{t-1} - k) + u_t, \end{cases} \quad (2.1)$$

126 where

$$\begin{cases} \delta_1 = 0 & \text{if } BR_{t-1} - \beta \cdot MR_{t-1} - k < 0, \\ \delta_2 \neq 0 & \text{otherwise;} \end{cases}$$

127

$$\begin{cases} \delta_2 = 0 & \text{if } BR_{t-1} - \beta \cdot MR_{t-1} - k > 0, \\ \delta_1 \neq 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

128 In equation (2.1) BR_t and MR_t represent, respectively, the bank admin-
 129 istered rates and the monetary rates at time t ; β is a regression coefficient
 130 that gives a measure of the extent of the monetary rate transmitted on bank
 131 rates in a long-term perspective: in the case of $\beta = 1$, the whole monetary
 132 rate is transmitted on the administered rate, while a value between 0 and 1
 133 means that only a partial transmission mechanism occurs; k is a constant
 134 that synthetizes all other factors that, in addition to the dynamics of mon-
 135 etary rates, may affect the transmission mechanism of the monetary policy
 136 on bank rates as, for example, the market power and the efficiency of a

137 bank; ϵ is the error term of the long-run equation; δ_1 and δ_2 represent the
 138 adjustment speeds converge towards the equilibrium level; finally, u_t is the
 139 error term of the short-run equation.

140 *2.2. The proposed model*

141 The aim of this subsection is to propose a bank rate model that, while
 142 based on the ECM, is more parsimonious and, therefore, easier to interpret
 143 and manage. To achieve this aim we examine the main components of the
 144 error correction model, so to establish a statistical methodology for their
 145 simplification.

146 First, it is of interest to check whether the assumption of a double error
 147 correction coefficient, introduced by Chong et al. (2006), is justified and
 148 strictly necessary. To check this point the previous model can be compared,
 149 in a hypotheses testing framework, with the following nested model:

$$\begin{cases} BR_t = k + \beta \cdot MR_t + \epsilon_t \\ \Delta BR_t = \alpha \cdot \Delta MR_t + \delta(BR_{t-1} - \beta \cdot MR_{t-1} - k) + u_t. \end{cases} \quad (2.2)$$

150 Differently from equation (2.1), the model in (2.2) contains only one
 151 adjustment speed, so it does not admit the possibility of an asymmetric
 152 convergence of the administered interest rate to its equilibrium level.

153 Second, the error correction model contains one equation for the level
 154 of administered interest rates, and one for its variations. The two can be
 155 analyzed separately, with the simple regression models:

$$BR_t = k + \beta \cdot MR_t + \epsilon_t \quad (2.3)$$

$$\Delta BR_t = k + \beta \cdot \Delta MR_t + u_t. \quad (2.4)$$

156 While model (2.2) explains the levels of banking rates in terms of the
157 level of monetary ones, equation (2.4) is a model for the variations of bank
158 rates in terms of the variations of monetary rates. These models, albeit
159 very simple, should be considered in practical applications, and compared
160 in predictive performance with the error correction model, to check whether
161 the latter can be simplified.

162 We anticipate that the above models are too simple to lead to a good
163 predictive performance. However, the idea of replacing the error correction
164 model with a one-equation one is tempting and, therefore, we now propose a
165 one equation model that can be a valid competitor of the ECM. To achieve
166 this aim we first examine the economic rationales behind the relationship
167 we would like to investigate.

168 From a microeconomic viewpoint, as deposits are saving tools in compe-
169 tition with other instruments (such as bonds), it seems quite reasonable to
170 assume that banks decide on the administered rate looking primarily at its
171 level. Starting from the level, one can always obtain its variation through
172 differentiation. A second consideration concerns the determinants of ad-
173 ministered bank levels. Again, it is reasonable to think that bank deposit
174 rates depend on both the level and on the variation of monetary rates. A
175 third assumption, particularly important when monetary rates are close to
176 zero, is that the level of deposit rates depends on the previous level of the
177 same quantity, to allow for a slow and partial reaction to monetary rate
178 changes, given that deposit rates affect considerably the income of a bank.

179 A macroeconomic perspective confirms the previous assumption: in par-

180 ticular, that is correct to consider, as a response variable, the level of the
 181 administered rate and not its variations. This because the relevant response
 182 variable for an expansion/restriction effect on the economy is represented by
 183 the level of the rates; on the explanatory side, we can model administered
 184 rate levels as a function of changes in the monetary rates, but also of their
 185 levels, which remain important even when close to zero.

186 On the basis of the above economic rationales, our proposed model is
 187 the following:

$$BR_t = k + \beta \cdot MR_{t-1} + \gamma \cdot \Delta MR_t + \delta \cdot BR_{t-1} + \epsilon_t. \quad (2.5)$$

188 The proposed model can be equivalently written in terms of the varia-
 189 tions of the administered rates:

$$\Delta BR_t = k + \beta \cdot MR_{t-1} + \gamma \cdot \Delta MR_t + (\delta - 1) \cdot BR_{t-1} + \epsilon'_t. \quad (2.6)$$

190 To improve interpretability, the proposed model can also be expressed
 191 in a differential form:

$$\frac{dBR}{ds} = \beta \cdot \left[\frac{dMR}{ds} \right]_{s=t} + \gamma \cdot \left[\frac{d^2MR}{ds^2} \right]_{s=t} + \gamma \cdot \left[\frac{dBR}{ds} \right]_{s=t-1}. \quad (2.7)$$

192 The previous equation shows that the model can be interpreted as a
 193 "physical" description of the banking behaviour in terms of deposit interest
 194 rates through its differentiation: the derivative of the bank administered
 195 rate depends both on the speed and on the acceleration/deceleration of
 196 monetary rates, as well as on the derivative of the administered rate with
 197 respect to its level in the previous time.

198 Note that the proposed model can be directly compared with the ECM
 199 with one adjustment speed. Comparing equation (2.2) and equation (2.5)
 200 it is clear that our proposal is a particular case of the latter, with some
 201 constraints on the parameters. By using the notational index 1 for the co-
 202 efficients of the one-speed ECM and the index 2 for the coefficients referred
 203 to the proposed model, such constraints are the following:

$$\begin{cases} -\delta_1 k_1 = k_2, \\ -\delta_1 \beta_1 = \beta_2, \\ \alpha_1 = \gamma_2, \\ \delta_1 + 1 = \delta_2. \end{cases} \quad (2.8)$$

204 Note, in particular, that the last equation in (2.8) implies that $(\delta - 1)$
 205 represents the adjustment speed to which bank administered rates react to
 206 changes in the monetary rates, equivalently as the parameters δ_1 and δ_2 of
 207 Chong et al. (2006) Error Correction Model.

208 A full comparison of our model with the ECM cannot be easily carried
 209 out in a statistical testing framework, as the two models are, evidently,
 210 not nested; however, they can be compared in terms of predictive perfor-
 211 mance and, for this purpose, the next Subsection introduces an appropriate
 212 methodology.

213 A different comparison between the two models can be carried out by
 214 looking at their time dynamics. This is of particular interest in the context
 215 of interest rate risk modelling. For sake of simplicity we illustrate this
 216 comparison for the first three one-month rates and, then, for the general
 217 situation.

218 For the error correction model, we consider the case of $\delta_1 \neq 0$; the other
 219 case of $\delta_2 \neq 0$ can be obtained analogously, replacing δ_1 with δ_2 . Then,
 220 assume that:

$$\begin{cases} \delta_1 \neq 0, \\ BR(0) = BR_0, \\ MR(0) = MR_0; \end{cases}$$

221 then, for the first month ahead:

$$\begin{aligned} BR_1 &= BR_0 + \Delta BR_1 = \\ &= BR_0(1 + \delta_1) + \alpha \Delta MR_1 - \delta_1 \beta MR_0 - \delta_1 k. \end{aligned}$$

222 For the second and the third month ahead, instead, we obtain:

$$\begin{aligned} BR_2 &= BR_1 + \Delta BR_2 = \\ &= BR_0(1 + \delta_1)^2 + \Delta MR_1(\alpha + \delta_1 \alpha - \delta_1 \beta) - \delta_1 \beta MR_0(2 + \delta_1) + \\ &\quad + \alpha \Delta MR_2 - 2\delta_1 k; \end{aligned}$$

$$\begin{aligned} BR_3 &= BR_0(1 + \delta_1)^3 + \Delta MR_1[\alpha + \delta_1(\alpha - \beta)(2 + \delta_1)] + \\ &\quad - MR_0 \delta_1 \beta [(1 + \delta_1)(2 + \delta_1) + 1] + \Delta MR_2(\alpha - \delta_1 \beta) - \delta_1 k(3 + 2\delta_1). \end{aligned}$$

223 For our proposed model, assuming the same initial values BR_0 and MR_0
 224 for the bank and the monetary interest rates, we find the following equation
 225 for the first month ahead:

$$BR_1 = MR_0 \beta + \Delta MR_1 \gamma + BR_0 \delta + k.$$

226 whereas for the second and the third month ahead we obtain:

$$BR_2 = MR_0\beta(1 + \delta) + \Delta MR_1[\beta + \delta\gamma] + \Delta MR_2\gamma + BR_0\delta^2 + k(1 + \delta);$$

$$BR_3 = MR_0\beta(1 + \delta + \delta^2) + \Delta MR_1[\beta + \delta(\beta + \delta\gamma)] + \\ + \Delta MR_2[\beta + \delta\gamma] + \Delta MR_3\gamma + BR_0\delta^3 + k\delta(1 + \delta).$$

227 From the above calculations we can derive a general iterative formula for
228 both models, in order to calculate bank interest rates at any time t (BR_t),
229 as functions of the levels of bank rates at time $t - 1$ (BR_{t-1}).

230 For the error correction model such iterative equation is:

$$BR_t = BR_{t-1}(1 + \delta_1) - \delta_1\beta \left[MR_0 + \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \Delta MR_s \right] + \alpha\Delta MR_t - \delta_1k. \quad (2.9)$$

231 Similarly, for our proposed model we obtain:

$$BR_t = \delta BR_{t-1} + \beta \left[MR_0 + \sum_{s=1}^{t-1} \Delta MR_s \right] + \gamma\Delta MR_t + k. \quad (2.10)$$

232 2.3. Predictive performance assessment

233 While the assumption of a double error correction coefficient can be eas-
234 ily tested against a one error correction model, other simplifications of the
235 ECM model require a more general set-up. This can be provided, for exam-
236 ple, by a predictive performance framework that we are going to illustrate
237 in this subsection. Doing so, we can enrich the error correction model with
238 a validation procedure that is, to our knowledge, not yet available in the
239 literature.

240 In order to predict bank rates, we need to estimate reasonable future
 241 values of the monetary rates. Consistently with the literature, we assume
 242 that their variation follows a Wiener process.

243 More formally, assume that we want to predict the level of monetary
 244 rates for each of the next 12 months. Let $\widehat{\Delta MR}_i$ indicate the variation
 245 of the monetary rate in a given month. We then assume that $\widehat{\Delta MR}_i$ are
 246 independently and identically distributed Gaussian random variables, so
 247 that:

$$\begin{cases} \widehat{\Delta MR} \sim N(0, \sigma^2) \\ \widehat{MR}_i = \widehat{MR}_{i-1} + \widehat{\Delta MR}_i \quad i = 1, \dots, 12. \end{cases} \quad (2.11)$$

248 Equation (2.11) describes a recursive procedure to obtain predictions of
 249 the monetary rates for a given year ahead, based on the Wiener process
 250 assumption. We can then insert the predicted monetary rates as regressor
 251 values in the models of the previous Subsection and, thus, obtain predictions
 252 for the administered bank rates. In particular, for model (2.1) we obtain:

$$\begin{cases} \widehat{BR}_i = \widehat{BR}_{i-1} + \widehat{\Delta BR}_i, \\ \widehat{\Delta BR}_i = \alpha \cdot \widehat{\Delta MR}_i + \delta_1(\widehat{BR}_{i-1} - \beta \cdot \widehat{MR}_{i-1} - k) + \\ \quad + \delta_2(\widehat{BR}_{i-1} - \beta \cdot \widehat{MR}_{i-1} - k) \end{cases}$$

253 where

$$\begin{cases} \delta_1 = 0 & \text{if } \widehat{BR}_{i-1} - \beta \cdot \widehat{MR}_{i-1} - k < 0, \\ \delta_2 \neq 0 & \text{otherwise;} \end{cases}$$

254

$$\begin{cases} \delta_2 = 0 & \text{if } \widehat{BR}_{i-1} - \beta \cdot \widehat{MR}_{i-1} - k > 0, \\ \delta_1 \neq 0 & \text{otherwise.} \end{cases}$$

255 For model (2.5) we obtain that:

$$\widehat{BR}_i = k + \beta \cdot \widehat{MR}_{i-1} + \gamma \cdot \widehat{\Delta MR}_i + \delta \cdot \widehat{BR}_{i-1}.$$

256 According to the standard cross-validation (backtesting) procedure, to
257 evaluate the predictive performance of a model, we can compare, for a given
258 time period, the predictions of monetary rates obtained with the previous
259 equations with the actual values. To obtain a robust measurement we can
260 indeed generate N scenarios of monetary rates, using (2.11), and obtain
261 the corresponding bank rates, using either (2.1) or (2.5). On the basis of
262 them we can calculate and approximate Monte Carlo expected values and
263 variances of the predictions, as follows.

264 Let Y be a bank rate to be predicted at time i , with unknown density
265 function $f_Y(y)$. The expected value of Y can then be approximated with

$$\widehat{\mathbb{E}(Y)} = \frac{1}{N} \sum_{k=1}^N y^{(k)}, \quad (2.12)$$

266 and its variance with

$$\widehat{var}(Y) = \frac{1}{N^2} \sum_{k=1}^N [y_i - E(\hat{Y})]^2. \quad (2.13)$$

267 In the next section we will use (2.12) and (2.13) to compare model
268 predictive performances. Before proceeding, we would like to remark that
269 the random number generation at the basis of the Monte Carlo algorithm is
270 pseudo-random, and depends on an initial seed. Different seeds may lead to
271 different results so that models can not be compared equally. We have thus
272 decided to use the same random seed for all models, so that the differences
273 in performances are not biased by the Monte Carlo random mechanism.

274 *2.4. On-demand deposits allocation*

275 The allocation of on-demand customer deposits to an appropriate ma-
276 turity time is a significant criticality in interest rate risk modelling, as well
277 as in asset and liability management of banks, given their particular char-
278 acteristics. The latter include: (i) the absence of a contractual maturity,
279 with the correlated ability of the depositor to withdraw the funds at any
280 time; (ii) the stability of the masses in time, along with the diversification of
281 counterparties that makes total volumes basically constant; (iii) the partial
282 and delayed reaction of banks as a result of changes in the monetary rate.

283 Theoretically, on-demand deposits could be assigned a zero maturity.
284 Doing so, however, the term structure of the liabilities of a bank does not
285 match the term structure of the assets which, especially on the lending side,
286 is characterised by positions with different maturities. Asset and liability
287 management becomes, therefore, based on an incorrect representation of the
288 cash flows of a bank, and this may bias interest rate risk measurement. For
289 example, an increase of monetary rates has a negative impact, lower than it
290 should be, as the duration of liabilities is lower than the real one. Similarly,
291 a decrease of monetary rates has a positive impact, lower than it should be.

292 Having established that a zero maturity cannot be the right time alloca-
293 tion for on-demand deposits, it remains the issue of finding an appropriate
294 one. On one hand, an allocation shifted towards short maturities reflects
295 the contractual nature of these deposits, which are subject to withdrawal
296 at any time; on the other hand, an allocation shifted towards long maturity
297 reflects their stability as a major source of funding.

298 From an asset and liability management perspective, a correct procedure
299 seems to allocate on-demand deposits to their actual maturity. This can

300 be estimated statistically, analyzing the observed decay of the volumes of
301 deposits: the approach followed, in current practice, by many banks. In
302 this context, on demand deposits are split between a non core component,
303 which remains at a zero maturity, and a core component, whose volumes in
304 the different maturity bands are estimated by means of a moving average
305 filter, such as that proposed by Hodrick and Prescott (1997).

306 From an interest rate risk perspective, it is important to consider what
307 regulatory requirements prescribe. The Basel Committee on Banking Su-
308 pervision does not give specific guidelines in its main documentation on
309 interest rate risk modelling (BIS, 2004); it does so in the recent document
310 on the Net Stable Funding Ratio (BIS, 2014), where it suggests a decay
311 percentage of 5% or of 10% of on-demand deposits in the first year. Na-
312 tional regulators are more prescriptive; for example, the Bank of Italy, whose
313 data will be analysed in the application Section, suggests to allocate 25%
314 of deposits in the non-core component and to allocate the remainder in the
315 following five years, with a $1/60$ decay in each month.

316 Here we join the two perspectives and propose an allocation model that,
317 while consistent with the regulatory methodology on interest rate risk, also
318 takes the asset and liability management view into account. Specifically,
319 we propose that the allocation of on-demand deposits to different time ma-
320 turity bands is performed, once regulatory requirements are satisfied, using
321 allocation coefficients that are function of the predicted administered rate
322 changes.

323 More precisely, we propose to allocate the 75% of deposits (core com-
324 ponent) proportionally to time band specific weight coefficients. Indicate a
325 time period with j , with initial time i_j and final time f_j . We can allocate

326 in it a volume that is equal to the total core component volume times the
 327 following weight:

$$W_j \propto e^{(BR_{f_j} - BR_{i_j}) \cdot (f_j - i_j)}$$

328 where BR_{f_j} and BR_{i_j} are the bank rates that correspond, respectively,
 329 to the final and initial time points of the j -th time band and the proportion-
 330 ality symbol means that, in order to obtain their correct value, the weights
 331 should be normalised dividing each of them by their sum.

332 The rationale behind our proposal is that, rather than using a con-
 333 stant allocation or a historical one, one can use an allocation of on-demand
 334 deposits that is based on the possible future evolution of interest rates, ac-
 335 cording to a forward-looking, rather than a backward-looking perspective.
 336 In this perspective, time periods with higher interest rates attract more
 337 volumes and, conversely, time bands with lower interest rates attract less
 338 volumes.

339 To calculate the previous weights, we can use the one-month ahead pre-
 340 dicted bank rates described in Subsection 3.3. Let $N = f_j$ be, without loss
 341 of generality, a specific time point (expressed in terms of months from the
 342 current date). The interest rate that corresponds to a maturity equal to N ,
 343 BR_N , can be obtained as follows:

$$(1 + BR_N)^N = \prod_{j=0}^{N-1} (1 + {}_jBR_1), \quad (2.14)$$

344 where ${}_jBR_1$ are the forward one month ahead bank administered interest
 345 rates predicted at time 0.

346 For example, for the ECM model:

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} {}_jBR_i = \widehat{BR}_{i-1} + \widehat{\Delta BR}_i, \\ \widehat{\Delta BR}_i = \alpha \cdot \widehat{\Delta MR}_i + \delta_1(\widehat{BR}_{i-1} - \beta \cdot \widehat{MR}_{i-1} - k) + \\ \quad + \delta_2(\widehat{BR}_{i-1} - \beta \cdot \widehat{MR}_{i-1} - k) \end{array} \right.$$

347 where

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \delta_1 = 0 \quad \text{if } \widehat{BR}_{i-1} - \beta \cdot \widehat{MR}_{i-1} - k < 0, \\ \delta_2 \neq 0 \quad \text{otherwise;} \end{array} \right.$$

348

$$\left\{ \begin{array}{l} \delta_2 = 0 \quad \text{if } \widehat{BR}_{i-1} - \beta \cdot \widehat{MR}_{i-1} - k > 0, \\ \delta_1 \neq 0 \quad \text{otherwise.} \end{array} \right.$$

349

while for our proposed model:

$${}_jBR_i = k + \beta \cdot \widehat{MR}_{i-1} + \gamma \cdot \widehat{\Delta MR}_i + \delta \cdot \widehat{BR}_{i-1}.$$

350

We remark that our approach could be compared with others, in terms
 351 of interest rate risk impact. This in line with what claimed in Esposito et
 352 al. (2013), who emphasize the importance of assessing the sensitivity of
 353 interest rate risk to different allocations of on-demand deposits. We also
 354 remark that an approach for the allocation of on-demand deposits similar
 355 to ours has been introduced in Coccozza et al. (2015): the main difference is
 356 that, in that paper the authors use, rather than the predicted bank rates,
 357 the rates that correspond to a hypothetical ± 100 basis point variation of
 358 the monetary rate transmitted by the ECM model. Finally, we remark that
 359 Blochlinger (2015) propose to hedge on-demand deposits, seen as a risky
 360 option, using a forward looking perspective similar to ours, based on a non
 361 linear model for deposit rate jumps.

362 **3. Data analysis and results**

363 *3.1. Descriptive analysis*

364 The recent financial crisis has had a major impact on the banking sector
365 and, in particular, has led to a change in the relationship between monetary
366 and administered rates and, therefore, to the transmission mechanisms of
367 monetary policies. In the Eurozone, characterized by one monetary author-
368 ity (the European Central Bank), that regulates still fragmented national
369 markets, this effect is particularly evident: southern european countries,
370 differently from what expected, have benefited very little from the drop of
371 monetary rates that has followed the financial crisis.

372 To investigate the above issues we focus on a southern european coun-
373 try, Italy, for which the transmission of monetary impulses is particularly
374 problematic, given the importance of the banking sector and the difficult
375 economic situation.

376 Accordingly, we have collected monthly time series data on monetary
377 rates and on aggregate bank deposits administered rates from the statistical
378 database provided by the Bank of Italy, for the period ranging from January
379 1999 to December 2014.

380 For the purposes of our analysis, the monetary rate used in this paper
381 is the 1-month Euribor. This choice has been based on the fact that this
382 rate has a greater correlation with the administered bank rate with respect
383 to the other monetary rates, such as the EONIA and the Euribor at 3 and
384 6 months, as can be seen in Table 3.1

385 Figure 3.1 represents the time series of the chosen monetary rates, along
386 with that of the aggregate administered bank rates on deposits, for the
387 considered time period.

| | EONIA | Euribor (1m) | Euribor (3m) | Euribor (6m) | Bank Rate |
|--------------|--------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|--------------|
| EONIA | 1.0000 | | | | |
| Euribor (1m) | 0.9904 | 1.0000 | | | |
| Euribor (3m) | 0.9801 | 0.9951 | 1.0000 | | |
| Euribor (6m) | 0.9701 | 0.9876 | 0.9972 | 1.0000 | |
| Bank Rate | 0.9488 | 0.9512 | 0.9453 | 0.9333 | 1.0000 |

Table 3.1: Correlation matrix between the EONIA rate, the Euribor rates and the Bank administered rate

388 From Figure 3.1 note that both the administered and the monetary rates
389 rapidly decreased in 2008 and 2009, while in the last two years they have
390 remained quite stable and close to zero. Moreover, the two curves seem to
391 have the same shape between 1999 and 2008, while the relationship between
392 the two radically changes in the following years, leading to overlaps and
393 different behaviours. In other words, the correlation pattern between the
394 bank administered rate and the monetary rate shows a very heterogenous
395 behaviour: before 2008 they seem to have a stable relationship; in 2008
396 they both dropped; after that time they look stable and close to zero, with
397 a relationship that is indeed quite different from the one observed before
398 the crisis.

399 To obtain further insights, in Figure 3.2 we present the histogram and
400 the corresponding density estimate of the two rates.

401 Figure 3.2 reveals that bank administered interest rates are more con-
402 centrated around their mean value, while monetary rates are quite spread.

403 It is also interesting to compare the distributions of the variations of the
404 two rates, represented in Figure 3.3.

405 From Figure 3.3 note that the variations of the administered bank rates




Figure 3.1: The observed monetary and administered bank rates

406 are more concentrated around zero, while monetary rates seem to have
 407 broader variations. Indeed, the behaviour of ΔMR justifies the assumption
 408 of considering the variations of monetary interest rates as a Wiener process,
 409 so that they can be modelled according to equation (2.11).

410 We have previously commented on the change in the relationship be-
 411 tween the two rates, comparing the situation before and after 2009. This
 412 switching behaviour can be easily seen by looking at the correlation between
 413 the rates and their variations. Table 3.2 shows the correlations between the
 414 rates and between their variations in the two periods (1999-2008) and (2009-
 415 2014), before and after the financial crisis.

416 From Table 3.2 note that the correlation between the levels of bank and
 417 monetary rates has decreased after 2009, while the correlation between the
 418 variations of the administered bank rates and those of the monetary rates




Figure 3.2: Distribution of the monetary and the administered bank rates

419 has increased during the same period.

420 3.2. Model estimates

421 For the models proposed in Section 3.1 and 3.2 we now show the cor-
 422 responding parameter estimates, considering the following four time series:
 423 (a) data from 1999 to 2007; (b) data from 1999 to 2008; (c) data from
 424 2009 to 2013; (d) data from 1999 to 2013. This choice of data windows
 425 is consistent with the aim of investigating the switching behaviour in the
 426 correlation structure of interest rates, which has occurred during the years
 427 2008 and 2009. On the basis of this windows selection we intend to obtain
 428 predictions for the years 2008, 2009 and, finally, for the last available year,
 429 2014. Predictions that can be compared with the actual occurred value,




Figure 3.3: Distribution of the variations of monetary and administered bank rates

| | 1999 - 2008 | 2009 - 2014 | 1999 - 2014 |
|------------------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| BR, MR | 0.95 | 0.71 | 0.96 |
| $\Delta BR, \Delta MR$ | 0.43 | 0.83 | 0.58 |

Table 3.2: Correlation matrix between rates and their variations, in different periods

430 thus giving a measure of model predictive performance.

431 We now show the parameter estimates for all the considered models,
 432 including the two simple univariate linear models, and the four periods we
 433 have chosen. For each estimate we also report the corresponding t-value,
 434 and the R^2 contribution of each model.

435 Table 3.3 shows the parameter estimates for the error correction model
 436 proposed by Chong et al. (2006) which, we recall, has two equations and,
 437 correspondingly, two R^2 measures.

438 From Table 3.3 note that, for the error correction model with two ad-
 439 justment speeds, the results confirm a radical change in the relationship

| | 1999 - 2007 | | 1999 - 2008 | | 2009 - 2013 | | 1999 - 2013 | |
|-------------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|
| | Coeff. | <i>t</i> | Coeff. | <i>t</i> | Coeff. | <i>t</i> | Coeff. | <i>t</i> |
| <i>k</i> | -0.133 | -3.426 | -0.100 | -2.542 | 0.263 | 12.265 | 0.146 | 7.896 |
| β | 0.351 | 29.741 | 0.341 | 29.425 | 0.138 | 4.836 | 0.271 | 41.114 |
| α | 0.107 | 4.412 | 0.0909 | 4.863 | 0.096 | 4.430 | 0.126 | 7.455 |
| δ_1 | -0.286 | -5.028 | -0.288 | -5.513 | -0.348 | -11.214 | -0.175 | -5.154 |
| δ_2 | -0.209 | -4.194 | -0.220 | -4.680 | -0.032 | -0.813 | -0.109 | -3.008 |
| R^2 long | 0.893 | | 0.880 | | 0.287 | | 0.905 | |
| R^2 short | 0.443 | | 0.485 | | 0.902 | | 0.449 | |

Table 3.3: Parameter estimates for the error correction model with two adjustment speeds

440 between the variables during the period under analysis: remembering that
441 the long-run equation models the levels of interest rates, while the short-run
442 equation is a function of the variations of the rates, it is clear that in the
443 last few years the levels of the rates have become less and less important,
444 while their variations have gained exploratory capacity.

445 Table 3.4 shows the parameter estimates for the error correction model
446 with one adjustment speed.

| | 1999 - 2007 | | 1999 - 2008 | | 2009 - 2013 | | 1999 - 2013 | |
|-------------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|
| | Coeff. | <i>t</i> | Coeff. | <i>t</i> | Coeff. | <i>t</i> | Coeff. | <i>t</i> |
| <i>k</i> | -0.133 | -3.426 | -0.100 | -2.542 | 0.263 | 12.265 | 0.146 | 7.896 |
| β | 0.351 | 29.741 | 0.341 | 29.425 | 0.138 | 4.836 | 0.271 | 41.114 |
| α | 0.111 | 4.620 | 0.096 | 5.300 | 0.145 | 5.316 | 0.131 | 7.903 |
| δ | -0.242 | -6.388 | -0.250 | -7.132 | -0.235 | -6.707 | -0.144 | -5.721 |
| R^2 long | 0.893 | | 0.880 | | 0.287 | | 0.905 | |
| R^2 short | 0.437 | | 0.480 | | 0.822 | | 0.444 | |

Table 3.4: Parameter estimates for the error correction model with one adjustment speed

447 From Table 3.4 note that the error correction model with only one ad-
448 justment speed shows results very similar to those reported in Table 3.3: in

449 particular, it has similar R^2 values, meaning that this simplified version of
 450 the error correction model fits past data quite well and, therefore, it may
 451 suffice. As a further confirmation, it can be shown that the equality as-
 452 sumption $\delta_1 = \delta_2$ in Chong et al. (2006) model is rejected only in one of
 453 the four considered time windows.

454 Table 3.5 shows the parameter estimates for the simple linear model in
 455 terms of the levels of the bank interest rates.

| | 1999 - 2007 | | 1999 - 2008 | | 2009 - 2013 | | 1999 - 2013 | |
|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|
| | Coeff. | <i>t</i> | Coeff. | <i>t</i> | Coeff. | <i>t</i> | Coeff. | <i>t</i> |
| <i>k</i> | -0.133 | -3.426 | -0.100 | -2.542 | 0.263 | 12.265 | 0.146 | 7.896 |
| β | 0.351 | 29.741 | 0.341 | 29.425 | 0.138 | 4.836 | 0.271 | 41.114 |
| R^2 | 0.893 | | 0.880 | | 0.287 | | 0.905 | |

Table 3.5: Parameter estimates for the linear model in terms of the levels of bank interest rates

456 From Table 3.5 note that the estimates obtained with the univariate
 457 linear model for interest rates are similar to those obtained by using the
 458 long-run equation of the error correction model.

459 Table 3.6 shows the parameter estimates for the simple linear model in
 460 terms of variations of bank interest rates.

| | 1999 - 2007 | | 1999 - 2008 | | 2009 - 2013 | | 1999 - 2013 | |
|---------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|
| | Coeff. | <i>t</i> | Coeff. | <i>t</i> | Coeff. | <i>t</i> | Coeff. | <i>t</i> |
| β | 0.149 | 5.444 | 0.131 | 6.344 | 0.278 | 11.28 | 0.162 | 9.592 |
| R^2 | 0.219 | | 0.254 | | 0.683 | | 0.341 | |

Table 3.6: Parameter estimates for the linear model in terms of the variation of bank interest rates

461 From Table 3.6 it is clear that the univariate linear model for the vari-

462 ations of administered bank interest rates, calculated as a function of the
 463 variations of monetary rates, shows different results: first of all, the inter-
 464 cept term is not significant; secondly, R^2 values have an opposite trend with
 465 respect to those in 3.5, increasing during the last period. This result is a
 466 further confirmation of the changing regime after 2009.

467 Table 3.7 shows the parameter estimates for our proposed model.

| | 1999 - 2007 | | 1999 - 2008 | | 2009 - 2013 | | 1999 - 2013 | |
|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|-------------|----------|
| | Coeff. | <i>t</i> | Coeff. | <i>t</i> | Coeff. | <i>t</i> | Coeff. | <i>t</i> |
| k | -0.064 | -4.394 | -0.061 | -4.561 | 0.077 | 8.498 | - | - |
| β | 0.100 | 9.369 | 0.098 | 10.992 | - | - | 0.042 | 6.205 |
| γ | - | - | - | - | - | - | 0.091 | 4.750 |
| δ | 0.743 | 25.695 | 0.746 | 30.454 | 0.731 | 24.544 | 0.869 | 40.836 |
| R^2 | 0.986 | | 0.987 | | 0.974 | | 0.998 | |

Table 3.7: Parameter estimates for the proposed model

468 Table 3.7 shows that our new model presents an interesting behaviour.
 469 For the whole period 1999-2013 all variables (apart from the intercept) are
 470 significant to describe the administered interest rates. But the situation
 471 changes if one concentrates on the first or on the second period: within the
 472 years 1999-2007 and 1999-2008 the variations of the monetary rates do not
 473 affect the level of bank rates; on the contrary, during the last period the
 474 only significant variable is the autoregressive component.

475 This is a clear evidence of the fact that, when rates are close to zero as in
 476 the last few years, administered interest rates are not affected by monetary
 477 rates, or by their variations, but, rather, they depend only on their past
 478 values.

479 *3.3. Predictive performances*

480 After having estimated the coefficients of the different models we then
 481 predict monthly administered bank interest rates and their variations for
 482 2008, 2009 and 2014, using a range of monetary rates scenarios, simulated
 483 from a Wiener process as previously described. In particular, for the 2014
 484 prediction we performed the simulations by using the coefficients obtained
 485 both by considering the whole period (1999-2013) and the second part of
 486 the time range under examination (2009-2013). In Figure 3.4 a comparison
 487 between the predictions for 2014 (data from 1999 until 2013) obtained with
 488 the error correction model and our proposed model is shown.




Figure 3.4: The estimated variations of administered interest rates for 2014, obtained with the error correction model and with our proposed model by using coefficients calculated on the whole period 1999 - 2013.

489 As a measure of predictive performance we have calculated the root
 490 mean square errors of the predictions from all models. Here we present the
 491 prediction results in terms of variations of bank rates rather than on their
 492 levels. This because, in this case, all the predictions are more challenging,
 493 being the variations on a smaller scale.

494 In Table 3.8 the root mean square errors of the predicted variations of
 495 administered interest rates obtained with the error correction model and

496 our proposed new model are reported.

| Model | 2008 (1999-2007) | 2009 (1999-2008) | 2014 (2009-2013) | 2014 (1999-2013) |
|------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Error correction model | 0.055 | 0.171 | 0.016 | 0.003 |
| Proposed model | 0.065 | 0.069 | 0.014 | 0.018 |

Table 3.8: A comparison between the root mean square errors of the predictions of ΔBR

497 The first column of Table 3.8 refers to the prediction errors for the
 498 year 2008, obtained with the two selected models, and using coefficients
 499 estimated on data from 1999 to 2007. Similarly, the second and the third
 500 column report root mean square errors for 2009 and 2014. We decided
 501 to compare predictions on these crucial years because they represent the
 502 breaking points before and after which the relationship between the rates
 503 radically changes. The objective is thus to verify whether the two models
 504 can adapt to such strong variations in the underlying economic system.
 505 Note that the last two columns both refer to estimations for 2014, but the
 506 first one uses coefficients estimated only the second period data, while the
 507 second one is based on estimations on the entire period 1999-2013.

508 From the analysis of Table 3.8 some interesting conclusions emerge: (a)
 509 both models predict quite well future variations of bank interest rates; (b)
 510 the error correction model works better on the whole period and, most
 511 interestingly, (c) our proposed model supplies great improvements for the
 512 crucial year 2009. This means that the new model is much more flexible
 513 than the Error Correction Model, and it is able to capture essential changes
 514 in the economy not only from an estimation fit point of view, as seen in the
 515 last subsection, but also in a predictive perspective.

516 *3.4. Application to interest rate risk*

517 Movements in interest rates can have a negative impact on both the
 518 income results and on the economic value of a bank. This has given rise
 519 to two distinct, albeit complementary, perspectives to measure the expo-
 520 sure to interest rate risk: the income perspective and the economic value
 521 perspective. In the first one the analysis is based on the impact of changes
 522 in monetary rates on short-term profits and losses of banks; in the second
 523 one, instead, the attention is focused on the sensitivity of the assets and the
 524 liabilities of a bank to changes in monetary rates.

525 In this application we confine our risk measurement to on-demand de-
 526 posits. For the evaluation of interest rate risk, we consider the allocation
 527 of such deposits in time maturity periods as described in Section 3.4. For
 528 ease of illustration, we consider only a one year period ahead. Table 3.9 and
 529 Table 3.10 describe the weight coefficients that result, respectively, from the
 530 application of the ECM and of the proposed model.

| Maturity | 1999-2007 (2008) | 1999-2008 (2009) | 2009-2013 (2014) | 1999-2013 (2014) |
|-------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Up to 1 month | 0.0835 | 0.0793 | 0.0834 | 0.0834 |
| From 1 to 3 months | 0.1660 | 0.1644 | 0.1667 | 0.1666 |
| From 3 to 6 months | 0.2500 | 0.2516 | 0.2501 | 0.2511 |
| From 6 months to 1 year | 0.5005 | 0.5047 | 0.4998 | 0.4989 |

Table 3.9: Allocation weights for ECM

531 By comparing Table 3.9 with Table 3.10 note that allocation coefficients
 532 are quite stable across time periods: this is consistent with the fact that, for
 533 the predicted years (2008, 2009 or 2014), the monthly variations of admin-
 534 istered bank rates are quite stable. The allocation weights are, therefore,

| Maturity | 1999-2007 (2008) | 1999-2008 (2009) | 2009-2013 (2014) | 1999-2013 (2014) |
|-------------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Up to 1 month | 0.0842 | 0.0803 | 0.0833 | 0.0838 |
| From 1 to 3 months | 0.1666 | 0.1667 | 0.1667 | 0.1682 |
| From 3 to 6 months | 0.2499 | 0.2511 | 0.2500 | 0.2513 |
| From 6 months to 1 year | 0.4993 | 0.5019 | 0.5000 | 0.4967 |

Table 3.10: Positioning coefficients for the proposed model

535 essentially a function of the number of months in each time maturity pe-
536 riod. If the allocation were done proportionally to the number of months,
537 as suggested by some regulators, we would indeed get similar results.

538 Note also that the ECM and the proposed model lead to very simi-
539 lar allocations, and this is a further evidence that our model, being more
540 parsimonious, should be preferred.

541 The measurement of the exposure to interest rate risk in the banking
542 book from the income perspective takes place over a short-term period
543 (called gapping period); in operating practice, this is usually equal to 1
544 year. According to this approach we can use the repricing gap model, which
545 calculates the expected change in the interest margin (IM) as the result of
546 a change in monetary rates. The corresponding formula is the following:

$$\widehat{\Delta IM} = \widehat{\Delta MR}_j \cdot \sum_{\substack{j \\ (t_j \leq T)}} G'_{t_j} \cdot (T - t_j^*) = \widehat{\Delta MR}_j \cdot G_T^w, \quad (3.1)$$

547 where G'_{t_j} indicates a marginal time gap (= *assets - liabilities*), $t_j^* =$
548 $\frac{t_j + t_{j-1}}{2}$ represents the average time maturity, and G_T^w indicates the cumula-
549 tive gap.

550 In Table 3.11 we present, for each node in the term structure of interest

551 rates, the impact on the interest margin of a positive change of 200 basis
552 points (the Basel II level) in the level of monetary rates, when the ECM
553 model is used to allocate volumes and it is assumed to consider core on-
554 demand deposits totalling to 100 euro.

| Maturity | $T - t_j^*$ | 1999-2007 (2008) | 1999-2008 (2009) | 2009-2013 (2014) | 1999-2013 (2014) |
|-------------------------|-------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Up to 1 month | 0.9583 | -0.1600 | -0.1521 | -0.1598 | -0.1599 |
| From 1 to 3 months | 0.8333 | -0.2768 | -0.2740 | -0.2778 | -0.2777 |
| From 3 to 6 months | 0.6250 | -0.3125 | -0.3145 | -0.3126 | -0.3138 |
| From 6 months to 1 year | 0.2500 | -0.2502 | -0.2523 | -0.2499 | -0.2495 |
| | | -0.9995 | -0.9929 | -1.0001 | -1.0009 |

Table 3.11: Expected changes in the interest margin for ECM

555 In Table 3.12 we present, for each node in the term structure of interest
556 rates, the impact on the interest margin of a positive change of 200 basis
557 points (the Basel II level) in the level of monetary rates, when our proposed
558 model is used to allocate volumes.

| Maturity | $T - t_j^*$ | 1999-2007 (2008) | 1999-2008 (2009) | 2009-2013 (2014) | 1999-2013 (2014) |
|-------------------------|-------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Up to 1 month | 0.9583 | -0.1614 | -0.1540 | -0.1597 | -0.1605 |
| From 1 to 3 months | 0.8333 | -0.2776 | -0.2778 | -0.2778 | -0.2804 |
| From 3 to 6 months | 0.6250 | -0.3124 | -0.3139 | -0.3125 | -0.3141 |
| From 6 months to 1 year | 0.2500 | -0.2496 | -0.2509 | -0.2500 | -0.2483 |
| | | -1.0010 | -0.9966 | -1.0000 | -1.0033 |

Table 3.12: Expected changes in the interest margin for the proposed model

559 Comparing Table 3.11 with Table 3.12 note that, as could be expected
560 from the corresponding volume allocation tables, there are not substantial
561 differences between the two models and across the different time periods, as

562 could be expected for the similar allocation weights in Tables 3.9 and 3.10.

563 We remark that, in the above tables, we have considered the impact
564 of an increase in monetary rates. The impact of a decrease is obviously
565 opposite.

566 The measurement of the exposure to interest rate risk in the economic
567 perspective can be based on the regulatory approach described in Basel II
568 (BIS, 2004), which relies on the concepts of duration and modified duration.
569 For a given (net) position, let F_t be the cash flow and t its corresponding
570 maturity; MR represents the interest rate at maturity, and NP is the total
571 net position market value. The duration D can be calculated as

$$D = \sum_{t=1}^T t \cdot \frac{F_t}{\frac{(1+MR)^t}{NP}}, \quad (3.2)$$

572 while the modified duration is

$$MD = \frac{D}{1 + MR}. \quad (3.3)$$

573 It is well known that variations in the market value of a position can be
574 expressed by the formula

$$\frac{\partial NP_i}{\partial MR_i} = -NP_i \cdot MD_i, \quad (3.4)$$

575 so that the variation of the economic value of a bank can be expressed
576 by

$$dEV = \sum_i \sum_j dNP_{ij}, \quad (3.5)$$

577 where i specifies a time slot (fourteen, according to BIS, 2014), while j
578 considers different currencies.

579 The previous equations refer to the general case: remembering that net
580 positions are defined as the difference between assets and liabilities, the
581 sign in the second member of equation (3.4) becomes positive if we consider
582 only on-demand deposits. Moreover, equation (3.5) can be simplified by
583 considering its discrete version:

$$\Delta EV = - \sum_i \sum_j NP_{ij} \cdot MD_{ij} \cdot \Delta MR_{ij}, \quad (3.6)$$

584 In Table 3.13 we present, for each node in the term structure of interest
585 rates, the impact on the economic value of a positive change of 200 basis
586 points (the Basel II level) in the level of the monetary rate, when the ECM
587 model is used to allocate volumes and it is assumed to consider core on-
588 demand deposits totalling to 100 euro. We have employed the approximate
589 duration suggested by the Basel Committee (BIS, 2004).

| Maturity | Duration | 1999-2007 (2008) | 1999-2008 (2009) | 2009-2013 (2014) | 1999-2013 (2014) |
|-------------------------|----------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Up to 1 month | 0.0400 | -0.0067 | -0.0063 | -0.0067 | -0.0067 |
| From 1 to 3 months | 0.1600 | -0.0532 | -0.0526 | -0.0533 | -0.0533 |
| From 3 to 6 months | 0.3600 | -0.1800 | -0.1811 | -0.1801 | -0.1808 |
| From 6 months to 1 year | 0.7100 | -0.7106 | -0.7166 | -0.7097 | -0.7084 |
| | | -0.9505 | -0.9566 | -0.9498 | 0.9492 |

Table 3.13: Expected changes in the economic value for ECM

590 In Table 3.14 we present, for each node in the term structure of interest
591 rates, the impact on the economic value of a positive change of 200 basis
592 points (the Basel II level) in the level of the monetary rate, when our pro-
593 posed model is used to allocate volumes, under the same assumptions as
594 before.

| Maturity | Duration | 1999-2007 (2008) | 1999-2008 (2009) | 2009-2013 (2014) | 1999-2013 (2014) |
|-------------------------|----------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|---------------------|
| Up to 1 month | 0.0400 | -0.0067 | -0.0064 | -0.0067 | -0.0067 |
| From 1 to 3 months | 0.1600 | -0.0533 | -0.0533 | -0.0533 | -0.0538 |
| From 3 to 6 months | 0.3600 | -0.1799 | -0.1808 | -0.1800 | -0.1809 |
| From 6 months to 1 year | 0.7100 | -0.7090 | -0.7126 | -0.7100 | -0.7053 |
| | | -0.9489 | -0.9531 | -0.9500 | -0.9468 |

Table 3.14: Expected changes in the economic value for the proposed model

595 Comparing Table 3.13 with Table 3.14 note that, for the economic capital
596 as well, there are not substantial differences between the two models and
597 across the different time periods, as expected.

598 A comparison between the interest rate risk in the income rather than in
599 the economic perspective shows that the main difference between the two is
600 due to the different consideration of the time factor ($T - t^*$) for the former
601 and the duration for the latter.

602 4. Conclusions

603 The main contribution of this paper is in the understanding and im-
604 provement of the Error Correction Model, used in standard professional
605 practice to model variations of the administered bank rates as a function of
606 monetary rates. We add to the model a predictive methodology, that allows
607 its validation, and propose a simpler to interpret one equation model, that
608 can be seen as a special case of the ECM itself.

609 We also contribute to the literature in interest rate risk by suggesting
610 a forward looking method to allocate on-demand deposits to non-zero time
611 maturity bands, according to the predicted bank rates.

612 We have shown the implications of our proposals on data for the aggre-
613 gate Italian banking sector, that concerns the recent period, characterised
614 by a substantial shift in the relationship between monetary and bank rates,
615 with the former getting close to zero.

616 Future research in this topic may involve the use of time-inhomogeneous
617 stochastic differential equations and dynamic linear models, in order to
618 improve the model ability to adapt to dynamic changes.

619 From an applied viewpoint, it may be of interest to analyze the relation-
620 ship between monetary and bank rates also on the asset side, and derive a
621 spread measurement.

622 Finally, a further extension should consider the microeconomic impact
623 of the found relationships on the probability of default of both financial and
624 non financial corporates, enriched with a systemic correlation perspective.

625 **5. Acknowledgements**

626 The Authors thank the Italian Association for financial risk management
627 (AIFIRM) and the MIUR PRIN project MISURA: Multivariate statistical
628 models for risk assessment, for financial support.

629 The Authors also remark that the present work actually stems from the
630 solution of a professional risk management problem suggested by Camillo
631 Giliberto and Igor Gianfrancesco, within the AIFIRM association.

632 Finally, the views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and
633 they do not reflect the views or policies of their Institutions: Banco di Desio
634 e della Brianza, Monte dei Paschi di Siena, University of Pavia.

635 **6. References**

636 Ballester, L., Ferrer, R., Gonzales, C., Soto, G.M., 2009. Determinants
637 of interest rate exposure of the Spanish banking industry. Working Paper,
638 University of Castilla-La Mancha.

639 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2004. Principles for Manage-
640 ment and Supervision of Interest Rate Risk.

641 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2014. Net Stable Funding
642 Ratio disclosure standards.

643 Blocklinger, A., 2015. Identifying, valuing and hedging of embedded
644 options in non-maturity deposits. *Journal of Banking and Finance* 50, 34-
645 51

646 Chong, B. S., Liu, M., Shrestha, K., 2006. Monetary transmission via
647 the administered interest rates channel. *Journal of Banking and Finance*
648 30(5), 1467-1484.

649 Cocozza, R., Curcio, D., Gianfrancesco, I., 2015. Non maturity deposits
650 and bank's exposure to interest rate risk: issue arising from the Basel Reg-
651 ulatory framework. *Journal of Risk* 17(4), forthcoming.

652 Demirguc-Kint, A., Huizinga, H., 1999. Determinants of commercial
653 bank interest margins and profitability: some international evidence. *World*
654 *Bank Economic Review* 13(2), 379-408.

655 Engle, R. F., Granger, C. W. J., 1987. Co-integration and error correc-
656 tion: representation, estimation, and testing. *Econometrica* 55(2), 251-276.

657 English, W.B., 2002. Interest rate risk and bank net interest margins.
658 *BIS Quarterly Review*, 67-82.

659 English, W.B., Skander J. Van den Heuvel, Zakrajsek, E., 2012. Interest
660 rate risk and bank equity valuations. *Finance and Economics Discussion*

661 Series, 2012-2026.

662 Entrop, O., Wilkens, M., Zeisler, A., 2009. Quantifying the Interest Rate
663 Risk of Banks: Assumptions Do Matter. *European Financial Management*
664 15(5), 1001-1018.

665 Esposito, L., Nobili, A., Ropele, T., 2013. The management of interest
666 rate risk during the crisis: evidence from Italian banks. Working Paper,
667 Bank of Italy.

668 Fiori, R., Iannotti, S., 2007. Scenario Based Principal Component
669 Value-at-Risk: An Application to Italian Bank's Interest Rate Risk Ex-
670 posure. *Journal of Risk* 9(3), 63-99.

671 Flannery, M.J., James, C.M., 1984. The effect of interest rate changes on
672 the common stock returns of financial institutions. *The Journal of Finance*
673 39, 1141-1153.

674 Gambacorta, L., 2005. How do banks set interest rates?. *European*
675 *Economic Review* 52(5), 792-819.

676 Gambacorta, L., Iannotti, S., 2007. Are there asymmetries in the re-
677 sponse of bank interest rates to monetary shocks?. *Applied Economics*
678 39(19/21), 2503-2517.

679 Hannan, T., Berger, A., 1991. The rigidity of prices: Evidence from
680 banking industry. *American Economic Review* 81, 938-945.

681 Heffernan, S.A., 1997. Modelling British interest rate adjustment: An
682 error correction approach. *Economica* 64, 211-231.

683 Hodrick, R., Prescott, E.C., 1997. Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An
684 Empirical Investigation. *Journal of Money, Credit, and Banking* 29(1), 1-16.

685 Houpt, J. V., Embersit, J. A., 1991. A Method for Evaluating Interest
686 Rate Risk in U.S. Commercial Banks. *Federal Reserve Bulletin* 77(2), 625-

687 637.

688 Kleimeier, S., Sander, H., 2004. Convergence in euro-zone retail bank-
689 ing? What interest rate pass-through tells us about monetary policy trans-
690 mission competition and integration. *Journal of International Money and*
691 *Finance* 23(3), 461-492.

692 Kleimeier, S., Sander, H., 2006. Expected versus unexpected monetary
693 policy impulses and interest rate pass-through in euro-zone retail banking
694 markets. *Journal of Banking and Finance* 30(7), 1839-1870.

695 Maudos, J., Guevara, J.F., 2004. Factors explaining the interest margin
696 in the banking sectors of the European Union. *Journal of Banking and*
697 *Finance* 28(9), 2259-2281.

698 Maudos, J., Solis, L., 2009. The determinants of net interest income in
699 the Mexican banking system: an integrated model. *Journal of Banking and*
700 *Finance* 33(10), 1920-1931.

701 Resti, A., Sironi, A., 2007. *Risk Management and Shareholders' Value*
702 *in Banking: From Risk Measurement Models to Capital Allocation Policies.*
703 John Wiley, New York.

704 Scholnick, B., 1996. Asymmetric adjustment of commercial bank inter-
705 est rates: evidence from Malaysia and Singapore. *Journal of International*
706 *Money and Finance* 15(3), 485-496.

707 Sierra, G. E., Yeager, T. J., 2004. What Does the Federal Reserve
708 Economic Value Model Tell Us About Interest Rate Risk at U.S. Community
709 Banks?. *The Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Review* 86(6).